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 NEUROECONOMICS AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING. AN 
EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS  
 
                         CHAVAGLIA, José (BR), FILIPE, José António (PT),  
                                    FERREIRA, Manuel Alberto M. (PT) 
                                            
        Abstract.  In an era in which the study of the brain gets increasingly featured as an 
        analytical tool of economic phenomena, the understanding of the way 
        Neuroeconomics works as a tool for managers, students and other economic 
        agents is now particularly important. There is now a need to have research that 
        allow the clarification of the analytical decision process and the potential of brain 
        study for decision making process of economic agents. Considering this new 
        reality, a study is presented concerning one of the most important issues for the 
        decision maker, which is the reinforcement learning process. 
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1 Introduction 
 
For a long time, philosophers and scholars of human behavior believed (and generally 
considered) that the individual was able to take his decisions in a rational way and thus it 
was possible to optimize his performance considering the different decision moments 
along each day. Maybe the phrase that best represents this is that of the Chilean poet, 
Pablo Neruda: “you are free to make your own choices but you are a prisoner of the 
resulting consequences”. 
With the emergence of the Neurosciences and their effective research techniques of the 
brain, the study of human behavior has evidenced a considerable bias about human 
rationality hypothesis, in particular, in times of economic decision. 
It is possible to identify notable scholars of human behavior and neurosciences making 
references to a set of relating areas in the development of this subject. It is important to 
consider authors who, among others, are already references nowadays, such as Daniel 
Kahneman (1934-), António Damásio (1944-), Patrick Renvoisé (2009), Geoffrey Miller 
(1965-), Nassin Taleb (1960-). 
The decision-making problems concerning the “reinforcement learning” have been 
shown as a kind of infinite possibilities for new studies about the decision-making 
process from a neuroeconomics point of view (Chavaglia, 2015, p. 99). This article 
represents another small contribution in this field of study.  
The real power is definitely not on the side of whoever is choosing. The decision occurs 
in a fraction of 2.5 thousandths of a second and several brain mechanisms are involved in 
the process of creating the preference after occurring the choice. This generates a series 
of biases as it is the case of the decision-making process concerning time (Varian, 2006: 
595), anchoring (Ariely, 2008: 23; Chavaglia, Filipe and Ramalheiro, 2011: 184), equity 
and corruption (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010: 11), law of small numbers (Kahneman, 2012: 
152), among other deleterious effects of reason. 
Therefore, this study aims to provide a contribution considering the way agents realize 
the neuroeconomics as analytical tool based on a mathematical presentation of the 
process of “reinforcement learning”. However, first of all this requires a formal 
presentation of Neuroeconomics. For that the article “Neuroeconomics: Decisions in 
Extreme Situations” (Chavaglia et al., 2015) will be used as a basis. 
 
2 Some Conceptual Considerations 
 
Neuroeconomics is the fusion not just of Neuroscience and Economics as the name 
directly suggests, but happens also from the junction of many other disciplines (biology, 
physics, chemistry, statistics, mathematics, psychology, pharmacology, among others). 
This  connection results in a decision-making process that is more ‘realistic’ and suitable 
for the everyday moments of life from economic agents’ point of view. Neuroeconomics 
arose from the need of achieving the most reliable results on the individuals economic 
decisions. 
Although considering Neuroeconomics concepts as the “theoretical framework” it is not 
possible to assert that there are Neuroeconomic theories as it occurs in traditional 
Economics. Neuroeconomics is the outcome of a set of biological and mathematical 
results of situations of cerebral processes of people’s decision making in Economics. 
Neuroeconomics is a new field of study in the Economics field that analyzes the 
relationship between the internal organization of the brain and individuals behavior. It is 
based on individual decision-making, social interaction and on institutions such as the 
market (Sandroni, 2007: 907). It is also an emerging transdisciplinary field which uses 
neuroscience measurement techniques to identify the neural substrates associated to 
economic decisions (Zak, 2004: 1737). 
However, there are some cases in which the combination of concepts and practices of 
Neuroeconomics with traditional methodologies occurs, as it happens, for example, with 
the use of applied mathematical axioms (Caplin and Dean, 2007: 16). 
This new field of study has within its core the premise that human beings are under 
bounded rationality and are driven by cognitive biases that are unconsciously derived; for 
this, Neuroeconomics proposes a particular vision vis-à-vis the traditional vision of 
traditional Economics. This new vision guarantees a significant importance in the 
development of economic studies which represent a reliable way for the decision making 
and for understanding the current complex economic problems in this new era of 
complex decision making processes. 
   
3 The Study 
 
The study consists in understanding the decision-making process in the economy, in 
particular with regard to the learning process. This theme should be constant in the study 
of Neuroeconomics. This is due to the fact the interaction with economic life be constant 
in the life of an individual. The mode as people create buying habits, negotiation 
processes, team management, sales or leadership, for example works as some ways 
Neuroeconomics deal with, being directly related to the form and type of learning.   
 
3.1 Reinforcement learning in Neuroeconomics 
 
A point that is relevant to the understanding of animal behavior (particularly of human 
beings) is the stimulus through rewards and punishments. To this end, the study related to 
the reinforcement learning seems relevant to understand this process. 
In the field of reinforcement learning the presence of two approaches is evidenced: 
Pavlovian conditioning and instrumental conditioning (see Tassi, 2011, p. 30). The first 
approach got its name because of its creator, Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849-1936), winner 
of the Nobel Prize for Medicine and Physiology in 1904. Pavlov found that some 
behavioral responses are no-conditioned reflexes, are innate rather than learned, while 
others are conditioned reflexes. These ones are learned by pairing with pleasant or 
adverse situations (see Edward, 2009, p. 59). Considering the instrumental process, an 
agent has control over future stimuli through his actions. It is the case of an animal that 
determines the release of food by pressing a lever. For Neuroscience still exists the issue 
of neural implementation of this learning, whereas neural structures and the question of 
how the information about the environment is stored, and how, from this information, 
adapted decisions are generated (see Tassi, 2011, p. 30). 
This way, it is interesting to note the importance of mathematical modeling of 
reinforcement learning (see Tassi, 2011, p. 33). 
 
 
or 
 
 
This means that in an attempt the predictive power of stimulus ( ) will  change, for 
more or for less, just if the value of the result, i.e. the obtained enhancement (R), is 
greater than or less than the one expected or predicted (⋁previous). If it is the same, no 
change will occur in the value. The intensity of change will be given for learning 
coefficient η (0<η≤1). The higher the value of learning coefficient η, the greater the 
importance of the result of the last attempt in determining the value of the stimulus (see 
Tassi, 2011, p. 33). 
Consider now the alternative model for Pavlovian conditioning: the rule of Temporal 
Difference (TD).  
TD model, unlike the previous one, does not deal with time as an object mathematically 
discrete, but takes into account the temporal relationships between the events in each 
attempt. Also in TD model, the agent learning goal is different. The agent seeks to make 
an estimate of the values of the different states or situations, in terms of reinforcements or 
future total punishments to predict in each state. The previous model, as we have seen, 
concerns only to learning considering one attempt (see Tassi, 2011, p. 34). 
Unlike the previous model, TD considers the effect time for analysis. Another difference 
refers to the goal of learning. The TD intends to make an estimate of the values of 
different states, considering a stimulus for future reward or punishment, as results from 
the mathematical model. The value of the state “s” at time “t” is:  
 
 
 
being 0  .  
The operator  indicates that  is the mathematical expectation or average of values in 
brackets for the various series of previous attempts (the model considers the assumption 
that the agent followed several times the sequence of states of t = 0 to t = n). The 
equation (3), considered in its extended form, shows that the value of the state “s” at the 
time “t” is equal to the value of reinforcement immediately available, summed to the 
discounted value by y of the reinforcement of the following state, plus the value of 
reinforcement of the successive state being  discounted, and so on, so that at each 
temporal step the value of the correspondent reinforcement has a similar devaluation, 
making that the most distant reinforcements have less value than the latest ones. This is 
the so called exponential discount. Equation (3) can be written as in the short form below. 
In order to simplify the notation,  instead of .  will be used. 
 
 
 
In this way the learning on TD is identified by the frequent repetition of the succession of 
states and by repeated estimates correction. Specifying, there is an adjustment made on 
the difference between the expected value and the value found to update the value of the 
state (see Tassi, 2011, p. 33). 
 
 
 
 
 
The equation 5 presents the error “ ” which is used to update the value “ ”. This 
equation represents the difference between the expected ( ) and the obtained one with 
the immediate reinforcement as the one resulting from the transition to a new state 
( ).  Obviously  encodes the surprise, the forecast error or the expectation’s 
violation. It will be used for updating the value of the state after the multiplication by a 
constant which determines, as in the previous case, how much the value will be changed 
depending on this signal. 
 
 
 
In this case, updating will depend on the learning coefficient η (η ≤ 1 0 <), and 
establishes how much the result of the recent experience will be crucial (see Tassi, 2011, 
p. 37).  
Let's see now the operating conditioning. In this model the transition between states will 
depend on the actions of the agent and the agent’s goal becomes choosing to be 
conditioned according to states associated with the largest sum of present and future 
reinforcements. Every action determines the transition and immediate reinforcement, but 
also the possible subsequent transitions and consistent reinforcements. This way, when 
the agent receives a reinforcement after a sequence of several actions it is necessary to 
find out what is the previous action that has increased the probability of reinforcement. 
Such a problem is called “temporal credit allocation” (see Tassi, 2011, p. 37). 
Considering the mathematical formulation, 
 
 
 
Another reinforcement learning algorithm to model the operating conditioning is “Q-
learning”. In this algorithm, the agent learns directly to find the best probability of action 
in every state without having to learn the value of each state (see Tassi, 2011, p. 38). 
 
. 
 
This equation, where  is the mean value of the action ( ) in the state ( ), gives how 
much the agent can, on average, expect if in the state  he chooses the action  and then 
choosing always the action that previous experience taught be the highest return. By 
making this choice, the agent moves to the next state and receives or not a reinforcement. 
At this point, the difference between the forecast and the true value will be calculated, , 
and this will be used to update the value of that state-action,  
 
 
 
while other values of  for the other state and action pairs remain unchanged. The 
process Q-learning consists on the repetition of three steps: (1) making the prediction of 
the expected reinforcement of candidate actions in that state; (2) selecting the action with 
the highest human reinforcement; and (3) updating the  value for that chosen pair state-
action, by using the error or discrepancy between the obtained and the expected value 
(see Tassi, 2011, p. 39). 
 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
The limited capacity of decision-making by individuals strongly suggests that the 
individual must support his analysis on models which are closer to the reality of the 
decision maker. Considering that, neuroeconomics models are a real possibility. 
However, it is necessary to use more advanced research techniques to study the brain of 
decision makers. Only by doing this, it will be possible to verify how the endogenous 
mechanisms of brain work at the same time agents make their choices. Certainly the 
qualitative gains in the analysis result very considerable. 
In addition to the use of more precise research forms, it is also important to submit this 
topic to a greater number of researches so that a major number of hypotheses will be 
tested in decision-making situations, particularly, in the area of economic decisions. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be prudent about the generalization of results considering 
the scientific and practical uses of these results. Neuroeconomics is still considered a new 
field of knowledge. The contribution of neuroscience and Economics considered together 
emerges as the formation of this new field. However, the results point to the fact that 
neuroeconomics appears itself as a completely new field because its premises, tests, 
applications and discussions have advanced to a single direction and distinct from paths 
that neuroscience followed and completely different from the path traced by the Orthodox 
economic science, if not often antagonistic. 
Specifically considering the issue of reinforcement learning, it is clear that its use - for 
the conceptual and practical understanding in daily economic institutions - has gains in 
analytical quality to address this issue on the prism of Neuroeconomics. It allows a 
systematically view of how learning triggers human behaviour. Subsequently, the 
mathematical model of the types of learning contemplates this understanding in a little 
more scientific way to determine quantitative interactions. This  appreciation 
immediately facilitates the study and dissemination in scientific media, which in turn, 
help to consolidate the theme as a field of study. 
Plainly the results found in many studies of neuro and behavioral economics show that 
humans are not fully rational in their decisions, for instance during elections on when 
deciding about other situations of complete uncertainty. This fact also emerges from data 
results obtained and worked on this analysis. 
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